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This paper considers a remarkable and largely forgotten narrative text which 
sheds light on the complexities and limitations of self-narration, and in doing 
so challenges overly simplistic understandings of narrative as a means of 
knowing or presenting the self. The text is The Truth Effect by Ross David 
Burke (1995) - a publisher’s note on the dust jacket of the American edition 
bluntly summarises the circumstances around its production: 
 
As soon as Ross David Burke finished his autobiographical novel in November 
1985, he took a massive overdose of drugs and ended a life that had been plagued 
for more than ten years by paranoid schizophrenia. 
 
 Even in this short summary a hint of the challenges posed to the reader and 
the difficulties encountered by Burke in writing the text is apparent. But while 
classifying The Truth Effect as an ‘autobiographical novel’ may be a useful 
shorthand description, it does not do justice to what transpires in the course of 
this organic and extraordinary record of Burke’s psychosis. A more accurate, 
but less tidy, description might be to call this text a narrative which sets out to 
be a fictionalised account of Burke’s life, but in which the architecture of 
fiction gradually collapses, and the central character’s descent into 
schizophrenic psychosis increasingly shadows Burke’s own breakdown. 
Moreover, in my view, it is in this collapse of fictional distance and the 
eventual coalescence of narrator and narrated that the ‘truth effect’ of the text 
is consummated. At its close an unmanageable and terrifying distress invades 
and destroys the narrative - the force of which is inimical to the spirit of fiction 
as construction, artifice, art. Yet, despite, or rather because of, this failure to 
maintain the distancing effect of fiction, the remarkable achievement of The 
Truth Effect is to bridge that gap or silence which Foucault (1999) famously 
asserted separates and polarizes the realms of reason and madness: this 
rapprochement is achieved through the text’s inconsistent and labyrinthine 
narrative economy. As the fictional architecture of the text crumbles, the reader 
is cast adrift in a disorienting narrative realm, and in that abyssal moment may 
understand that s/he is dimly glimpsing the interior world of its author. 
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 The plot of The Truth Effect is fairly simple. The story tracks the 
adventures of the narrator (a character named ‘Sphere’) and his group of 
hippyish friends. Sphere records his experiments with hallucinogenic drugs, his 
brushes with the police, a spell in prison, his sexual relationships, and the birth 
of his daughter. At first the narrative’s tone evokes the counter-culture and 
‘hippy-texts’ of the early 1970s in which it is set (see Farina, 1972; Thompson, 
1972). Thus, narrative oscillates between the fantastic and the prosaic, layering 
myth, mysticism, science-fiction, drug-fuelled hallucination and paranoia, and 
graphic sexual imagery on top of a more recognizable narrative universe (ie. 
the ‘real’ world). The laconic, stoned tone is exemplified at the beginning of 
the story when Sphere describes a trip into town with his friends: 
 
We were on our way to the local hotel to get the monetary system into our septic 
system. In other words, we were high out of our minds on hallucinogenic 
mushrooms and we were on our way to the pub to get drunk and forget our sexual 
problems. (p.26) 
 
 As the story unfolds, however, this nonchalant tone is gradually eroded by 
intrusions of distress and disturbance. The reader begins to realise that the 
narrated realm does not represent the reality of Sphere’s life and that he is 
actually living through intense psychological suffering. It becomes clear that 
Sphere is trying to transform his life into a counter-cultural fantasy/fiction by 
re-writing his distress. 
 The true story of The Truth Effect emerges gradually, but is prefigured 
even at the start of the book, where, in what then appears to be an oddly 
anomalous passage, Sphere declares: 
 
I live in a psychiatric hospital […] Society is out to kill me and already my 
thoughts have begun to hallucinate about this place. […] I was out of control. Lost 
in my world of confusion. I realized that something was going wrong with my 
reasoning. I was talking shit again. My thoughts jumped. (pp.25 and 26) 
 
 The full significance of the narrative is evident in its form rather than its 
content: to grasp the true story we need to study the text’s complex narrative 
mechanics, and in particular the multi-layering of narrative - a central means 
by which the disintegrating self is (perhaps involuntarily) signified. At first this 
layering appears unremarkable, but as the layers gradually split violently apart 
or, inversely, coalesce into an anguished howl, their value to understanding 
Burke’s/Sphere’s true story becomes obvious. 
 In the story-world, Sphere is writing a book about his life: a central textual 
conceit is that the artefact we are reading was written by Sphere. Thus, The 
Truth Effect is a book by Ross Burke, about a character named Sphere who is 
also writing a book about his life. This, as I shall go on to show, is crucial to 
the import of the work. Furthermore, there are narrative layers within the story-
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world. Sphere is both narrator and protagonist, but these 2 roles are often at 
variance,1 with the teller and the told-of occupying shifting and inconsistent 
sites. At times Sphere-narrator understands more about the realities of his 
distress than Sphere-protagonist; but at other times narrator and protagonist are 
indistinguishable and the text becomes akin to an agonized diary entry. As 
narrator/‘author’, Sphere seems sometimes to believe in the fantastic realm he 
is spinning, yet at other moments he appears aware that it represents a fiction 
or delusion. Thus, Sphere’s position as narrator shifts restlessly throughout, 
creating an impression that he is continually making ineffectual attempts to 
find a coherent subject position. All of this can make the narrative structure 
seem like a hall of distorting mirrors: frequently the text appears to be divorced 
from any stable narrative ground, that is, any narrative grounded in ‘reality’, 
fictional or otherwise. 
 Burke’s/Sphere’s attempt to re-write distress by transforming it into 
fantasy is addressed in frequent metafictional asides in which the difficulties 
and possibilities of narration are addressed. Indeed, in retrospect, it becomes 
clear that even the opening sentence of the book is tacitly acknowledging that a 
process of fictionalization is beginning: 
 
Once upon a time, the story began with our hero, hereafter called Sphere, 
answering the unasked question. (p.25) 
 
 Here the explicit naming of an alter ego is foregrounded (“hereafter called 
Sphere”). We might stop to ask: so what was the hero’s name before this 
‘hereafter’? And an answer might be: Ross Burke. There is a sense of Burke 
drawing a curtain aside to reveal his self-created alter, renaming himself, and 
directing attention toward his fictional protagonist - thereby trying to remove 
the exigencies of his actual existence from the reader’s view, and perhaps his 
own too. 
 As the narrative unfolds and the existential tactics on which Burke’s 
writing are predicated become clearer, such metafictional asides accrue 
poignancy and resonance. The ‘persons’ of Sphere and Burke become hard to 
distinguish. Thus, when Sphere addresses his writing in a passage which veers 
towards dislocation from the diegetic context, little decoding is needed on the 
reader’s part to deduce that the sentiments may not just be Sphere’s, but 
Burke’s too. 
 
It’s a book about the things a man couldn’t face but, once faced, their significance 
fades into insignificance. It’s about the meaning of a word, Sphere, that means 
nothing, zero or perfection. I wanted a reason to live so I invented a reason. 
 (p.198) 
 
 Here, the fictionalizing of the self is invoked as potentially therapeutic: for 
Sphere-Burke the strategies of ‘invention’ and creating an alter-ego are 
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attempts to manage “the things a man couldn’t face”. Furthermore, a 
considerable investment has been placed in the fictionalised narrative 
economy: Sphere declares that his reason for living is situated in an invented 
realm and is itself an ‘invention’. This powerful declaration brings to mind the 
work of theoreticians like Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney on the dynamics 
of narrative identity. Ricoeur’s statement (1991: 26) that “to speak of the world 
of the text is to stress the feature belonging to every literary work of opening 
before it a horizon of possible experience, a world in which it would be 
possible to live,” or his assertion (ibid: 33) that “by means of the imaginative 
variations of our own ego … we attempt to obtain a narrative understanding of 
ourselves” accord with aspects of Burke’s project here. However, in the light 
of the failure at the heart of this book to maintain the narratively remade self, 
one is drawn to Kearney’s warning (2002: 95) that “story-telling can also be a 
breeding ground of illusions, distortions”. In his account of the ethics of the 
narrative self, Kearney maintains (2002: 96) that the “process of narrative 
critique takes the form of a cathartic clarification whereby the self comes to 
know itself by retelling itself”, and that this stands opposed to the bad faith of a 
narrative emplotment which serves “as cover-up”. In this, he argues (2002: 96), 
“narrative concordance may mask discordance, the drive for order and unity 
[displace] difference, happy endings [conceal] contradictions”. For the 
individual living with acute distress, stigmatized by his culture, and whose very 
existence invokes disapprobation, the motivation to produce an acceptable 
story instead of one which fits with his experience may be intense. Burke’s 
narrative reconfiguration of himself as the drug-addled Sphere may seem on 
the surface to be less socially acceptable than a story of schizophrenia; 
however, in the narrative’s context - that of a group of 1970s counter-cultural 
‘freaks’ - dropping-out and drug use are normative, while Sphere’s ‘real’ 
madness disturbs the fabric of this micro community. 
 The rejection of the ‘real’ Burke-Sphere by his hippy comrades, in which 
his attempts to signify the truth of his disturbing counter-reality are rebuffed, is 
repeatedly invoked in the text. Here are three examples: 
 
I was flipping out into a science-fiction nightmare. “Rainbow, did you say that we 
had been captured by an unidentified flying saucer?” I asked. 
 “No, mate.” 
 Shit, the meaning of the universe lost. […] 
 “You and your dreams usually make no sense. You’ve got a disturbed head.” 
  (pp.38-9) 
 
My conviction is for all of our thoughts to be free. 
 “Bullshit,” Wasteland says. (p.112) 
 
I said, “[…] I’m a sorcerer and we will live in lightning flashes for ever.” 
 “Footrot, mate,” [Cane Toad] replied. “When are you going to talk straight?” 
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 (p.118) 
 
 Such episodes are frequently followed by moments of intense anguish for 
Sphere in which he appears to be left, as both narrator and protagonist, 
anxiously grasping for certainty as his faith in his fantasy existence is 
undermined. For instance, after one such rejection, Sphere-as-protagonist 
withdraws from his friends and internally recites an anxious mantra: 
 
I crossed the room and looked into the mirror and thought, Whoever knows the 
rules can play the game, Whoever knows the fear words can control the universe. 
 (p.91) 
 
 But following this, his withdrawal is reproduced in the narration as it also 
withdraws (from the story-world) and switches to the present tense: 
 
Still I know that nobody controls the universe. In the end it comes and goes and 
we’re going back to where it comes from. Now it comes back on me as five years 
ago it was the culmination of acid rock and now I have become disco. (p.91) 
 
 Here, it is as if Sphere no longer narrates but rather speaks to himself (to 
Sphere-Burke) of lonely delusion. This pattern recurs throughout the text, until, 
at the end, narration barely engages with the story-world or its characters at all. 
The impression is produced that both protagonist and narrator are becoming 
increasingly isolated within and from their creations; and that Sphere is 
realising that the foundations underpinning his narrative reworking of the self 
are unsound. Narration comes to resemble less a reliable window onto a 
consistent realm and more the outworking of a lonely pathology. Moreover, 
and fashioning a deeply unsettling experience for the reader, the growing 
conflicts between Sphere and his friends signifies one of the most obvious 
ways in which the fictional architecture of the text collapses. The 
‘consensuality’ of the story-world (that is, its quality of being shared and 
participated in by all of its characters) erodes - not by means of clever 
postmodern narrative trickery, but rather because of an uncontained narrative 
entropy. Thus, as we have seen, at first Sphere speaks of ‘we’ and ‘us’ - 
implying that all the characters participate in the same story-world, and that the 
text is structured around a singular mutual ‘reality’. Yet, as his characters 
increasingly reject the vision of reality that Sphere offers, it becomes apparent 
that he inhabits a different realm to his creations, and that, in addition, Sphere-
as-narrator and Sphere-as-protagonist inhabit different realms to each other. 
That the characters in this text become increasingly autonomous from, and 
hostile to, their ‘author’, can be read as a powerful image of the dislocated self 
- whose imaginative creations have come to assume a terrifying life of their 
own. 
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 Burke’s choice of name for his protagonist is significant; and again sheds 
light on the fictionalizing process. There are several revealing moments in the 
narrative when its etymology and connotations are invoked. 
 
It’s a book about the things a man couldn’t face but, once faced, their significance 
fades into insignificance. It’s about the meaning of a word, Sphere, that means 
nothing, zero or perfection. I wanted a reason to live so I invented a reason. 
 (p.198) 
 
The symbol is sphere. When the last sphere, the sun, the earth rolls into its ordered 
place, you will see before your eyes all the days of your life. (p.195) 
 
Go to the centre of the Sphere. I am the perfect ego self […]. (p.180) 
 
 In the first of these quotations, ‘Sphere’ is denoted as a “word” rather than 
a name, emphasizing that the choice has emerged from a process of narrative 
and lexical craft. In addition, allusions to fictionalization (‘invention’ and ‘the 
book’), are interwoven with references to the connotations of the name 
‘Sphere’, here deemed to signify “zero or perfection”. ‘Sphere’, then, has been 
selected firstly because of its connotations of negation and emptiness whereby 
what is present and painful is reconstituted as nothing. To recall Blanchot, 
narrative appears here as that “constitutive re-move whereby imagination 
negates given states of affairs” (Clark, 1992: 77). Secondly the name invokes 
wholeness, perfection, plenitude, and completion. We might think here of the 
Copernican notion (1976) of the heavenly spheres, or Heidegger’s discussion 
(1971: 123) of the symbolism of the sphere: 
 
But only Presence itself is truly present - Presence which is everywhere as the 
Same in its own center and, as such, is the sphere. 
 
 Such connotations are pertinent because a defining motif of The Truth 
Effect is Burke’s/Sphere’s longing for a salutary wholeness of self. But the 
desire for wholeness can be also linked to a view of fiction as self-sufficient or 
separate from the world - in which what is painfully ‘significant’ may be 
transformed into trivia through the process of fictionalization. In such a reading 
the ‘wholeness’ and perfection of the (mythical) sphere align with an image of 
the fictional text, and, by extension, the narratively transformed self, as 
separate from the painful contingencies of existence. 
 However, the mythical perfection of the self-sphere is symbolically 
violated - again, even on the first page of the narrative. 
 
Once upon a time, the story began with our hero, hereafter called Sphere, 
answering the unasked question. I wonder why I answer when the answer presents 
itself? I answer because I am a little-known secret that is soon to become a well-
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known secret. I answer because I am […] Let me again introduce myself. I am 
Sphere, and this is the book of fear. It is a book of years. It is a book of power and 
here is its strength. It is about non-reality and reality and dreams and nature and 
truth. (p.26) 
 
 Sphere’s declaration, “I answer because I am”, has echoes of the Cartesian 
cogito (‘I think, therefore I am’), and all of its attendant implications of the self 
as contained, atomistic, and whole. Yet this image of the self-contained 
self/sphere/fiction is immediately punctured. “I am Sphere, and this is the book 
of fear” foregrounds the phonetic proximity of ‘Sphere’ and ‘fear’; 
connotations of wholeness and self-sufficiency inhering in ‘Sphere’ are 
undercut by a tacit acknowledgement that it co-exists with its binary opposite. 
After all, fear is catalysed by the possibility of being overwhelmed by 
something other - something ‘outside’ our sphere of reference. Thus, the 
sphere’s/self’s smooth periphery is overshadowed by threat and vulnerability. 
 The Truth Effect ends with a shocking narrative collapse. Following the 
end of Sphere’s relationship with his lover, the story-world suddenly vanishes 
and is replaced with a series of bizarre and delusional passages apparently 
detached from any diegetic context. The only way that this section might be 
assimilated into the story as a whole is as an immersion of the narrator into his 
madness and his complete separation from any social context. Finally, even the 
fragile cohesion of delusion seems to shatter into despair, with Burke-Sphere 
attempting to reach out to his readers from both the fantasy of the text-world, 
and the loneliness of madness. 
 
Cursed. My life is a living hell. The book is a lie. Do you fucking understand, 
creeps and cretins? It's a lie. I am a liar. It’s a fantasy. (p.217) 
 
 Here Burke-Sphere relinquishes fiction/fantasy, and signals its failure as a 
strategy to manage and transform distress. He goes on: 
 
This is the world I love being murdered by the beasts of more. This is our 
salvation and our destruction […] Do you want more? Shall I go on? More, more, 
more. The child molester came out of hell. Do you want more? (p.217) 
 
 The following page is entirely filled with the italicised word ‘more’ 
arranged in lines and columns. This textual fracture consummates the complete 
failure of narrative, suggesting that it can no longer contain suffering - that 
there is, and always will be, ‘more’, an unmanageable excess, or, to borrow 
from William Styron’s description (1992: 83) of mental illness, that ‘behind’ 
this page is “a horror […] so overwhelming as to be quite beyond expression”. 
 Opposite the final page of the narrative, the editors have included a 
transcript of Burke’s suicide note; reading it, one realises that Burke and 
Sphere have indeed moved ever closer, until by the close they are 
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indistinguishable. Sphere also decides on suicide and his declaration that “My 
life is a living hell […] I never will escape from paranoid schizophrenia” 
(p.217) shockingly anticipates Burke’s explanation: “I cannot live in insanity 
and that is the only reason why I die. I’m a paranoid schizophrenic and for us 
life is a living hell” (p.221). 
 In the final paragraph of The Truth Effect, Burke-Sphere writes that “the 
book has died” (p.220). The statement is closely hemmed in by the textual 
signs of Burke’s and Sphere’s deaths. The ‘death of the book’ signifies, for me, 
the failure of the narrative project by means of which Burke has attempted to 
transform his existence. Yet, in part because of this ‘failure’, his text stands as 
an extraordinary and terrible record of a mind at the end of its tether. The truth 
effect of Burke’s narrative is produced precisely in the collapse of his intended 
narrative strategy: it is in the erosion and overwhelming of narrative intention, 
the transgressions of shifting narratological boundaries, that we perceive the 
figure of Ross Burke and his suffering. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. In any narrative - even when the narrator is telling his own story, there are 
two separate entities at work: a teller and a told-of. And these can never 
wholly coincide (the famous autobiographical doubling in the self, the 
inherent split in autobiography). 
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